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2	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
3	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
4	Case No. 09-50026(REG)
5	x
6	In the Matter of:
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8	MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY, et al.
9	f/k/a General Motors Corporation, et al.,
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11	Debtors.
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15	United States Bankruptcy Court
16	One Bowling Green
17	New York, New York
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19	October 28, 2010
20	3:05 PM
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23	BEFORE:
24	HON. ROBERT E. GERBER
25	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

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     TELEPHONE CONFERENCE re Letter Dated October 28, 2010 from
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     James L. Bromley to Judge Gerber
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     Transcribed by: Lisa Bar-Leib
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Page 5 PROCEEDINGS 1 THE COURT: This is Robert Gerber. 2 I would like to get appearances from those folks who think they're likely to 3 want to speak this afternoon. And then I'll deal with the 4 5 substantive matters incident to this request for a conference. 6 As I believe you all know, after I read the submissions, I thought it appropriate that this call be on the record. And 7 therefore, we have our recording equipment running now. 9 I have letters from each of Cleary and Jones Day. Who would like to begin with the appearances first? 10 11 MR. BROMLEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. This is James Bromley from Cleary Gottlieb in behalf of the 12 13 UAW. THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Bromley. 14 MS. LENNOX: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 15 16 Heather Lennox of Jones Day on behalf of General Motors LLC for which we refer to as New GM. 17 18 THE COURT: Right. Okay. And I assume the two of you folks will be the principal spokespeople on this 19 20 conference? 2.1 MS. LENNOX: Yes, sir. 22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 MR. BROMLEY: That's correct. THE COURT: Each of the letters that I got seems to 24 make various requests from me. Is there a recommended order in 25

Page 6 terms of who I should allow to be heard first with the 1 2 understanding that each of you guys is going to get the opportunity to respond and reply and, if need be, surreply? 3 MS. LENNOX: Your Honor, this is Ms. Lennox. Mr. Bromley requested the conference that is apparently 5 6 requesting a delay, I would defer to him to go first. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Bromley? 7 MR. BROMLEY: Thank you, Your Honor. And thank you, 8 9 Ms. Lennox. I appreciate that. 10 Your Honor, we have a bit of an issue here because we 11 have two pending actions dealing with essentially the same set of fact circumstances. We have a complaint that has been filed 12 13 in the Eastern District of Michigan before Judge Cohn. That complaint was filed in April of this year. Through agreement 14 of the parties --15 16 THE COURT: Pause, please, Mr. Bromley. I'm having 17 some problems hearing you. 18 MR. BROMLEY: I apologize, Your Honor. I'll speak louder. 19 20 THE COURT: Yes. Would you, please? And tell me, in particular, when the complaint was filed? 21 22 MR. BROMLEY: Yes, Your Honor. There is a -- as I 23 mentioned, there is a complaint that has been filed in the Eastern District of Michigan before Judge Cohn. It was filed 24 25 on April 6th, I believe, of this year. It was served in

September. And the complaint has been answered by New GM. And a motion to strike certain affirmative defenses has also been filed by the UAW before Judge Cohn. There is a status conference in that case scheduled for the 3rd of November. And the defendant has, I think, until the 4th of December -- I mean, November, excuse me, to respond to the motion to strike.

Now, I should say that while the plaintiffs filed in April, the issue underlying this was first joined in October of 2009 when the UAW made a demand on New GM to pay certain amounts under what is known as the 2007 memorandum of understanding, or MOU. That demand was made immediately upon the confirmation of the Delphi plan of reorganization and, in a letter dated November 11th, 2009 to New GM, denied any responsibility for making the payments that we claim are required. Now the MOU, this from 2007, relate to obligations making payment of 450 million dollars, a very substantial sum, into what was known in -- by various terms as old VEBA, the DC VEBA, the dental VEBA or the existing external VEBA. All those are set out on terms and appear in various forms in different documents. So they are all the same -- refer to the same vehicle.

So the UAW raised the issue in October, made demand of payment in October of 2009. The General Motors denied responsibility in November and a complaint was filed in April of 2010. The complaint was served in September of 2010 and

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answered by New GM just this month in October.

agreement among the parties.

THE COURT: Pause, please, Mr. Bromley. Delays in service of process when you can't find the defendant are fairly common. But when you told me there was an apparent delay between April and September in service of New GM whose address I had always understood to be the one that you listed in the complaint. Was there a reason for the delay in service?

MR. BROMLEY: Yes, Your Honor. The parties were attempting to work this out and the delay in service was an

THE COURT: All right. Continue, please.

MR. BROMLEY: And so, Your Honor, we did serve the complaint in September and it has been answered. The present motion brought by New General Motors was filed just a week ago and we have presently scheduled an objection deadline of the 2nd of November and a scheduled hearing date of the 9th of November. And it is the view of the UAW that this Court should hold off on dealing with this motion in deference to the existing action before Judge Cohn.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Lennox?

MR. BROMLEY: We understand that General Motors has filed a motion and claims that there are exclusive jurisdiction arguments relating to the sale order that approve the sale to New GM. But I think they miss the point which is that the cause of action in Michigan does not relate to the sale order.

Page 9 What it relates to is an assumed contract between two nondebtor 1 2 parties and an obligation under that contract that is not within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court. 3 THE COURT: Well, that's the matter to be decided, 5 isn't it, Mr. Bromley? 6 MR. BROMLEY: Yes, it is, but that certainly is the UAW's position. And we believe that that issue has been joined 7 for Judge Cohn and that it should be allowed to proceed in that 9 way. THE COURT: Well, that's one of the reasons why I 10 11 have problems with each of your positions, folks. But is there anything else that I should hear from you now, Mr. Bromley, 12 13 before I hear from Ms. Lennox? MR. BROMLEY: At this point, Your Honor, I think 14 that's what we have to say to start. But we certainly would 15 16 reserve our right to reply to Ms. Lennox. THE COURT: I understand. All right. Ms. Lennox? 17 MS. LENNOX: Thank you, Your Honor. Mr. Bromley got 18 19 the timing of the parties' interaction generally correct. The 20 complaint was filed in April of 2010. The parties did agree and stipulated that service would be delayed until October 4th 21 22 of this year while the parties attempted to work out their 23 issues with respect to this dispute. New GM made it perfectly clear to the UAW throughout these discussions that they 24

believed that the UAW retiree settlement agreement that was

approved in this Court's sale order governed this dispute. And so certainly that was not a surprise to the UAW. The parties had settlement discussions and when the settlement discussions seemed to break down, the UAW served the complaint on September 17th of this year. Once it became evident that resolutions of the dispute would not be forthcoming then New GM looked at the provisions of the UAW retiree settlement agreement and immediately sent the notice of dispute required under paragraph 26 of that agreement and it was required to wait twenty-one days for the UAW to respond. On the twenty-first day, the UAW did respond with kind of the same arguments the parties had discussed in the past. And so, on the very next day, New GM filed the motion that's before Your Honor.

I would say to Your Honor that while this is pending because New GM had taken quite strong positions that this matter is governed by the UAW retiree settlement agreement, New GM had asked the UAW if it could have an extension to file an answer in the Michigan district court because it believed quite clearly that Your Honor has exclusive jurisdiction over this issue. And that request was denied. So we were compelled to file an answer so we wouldn't lose any rights in the Eastern District of Michigan. And we filed this motion just as soon as we could in front of this Court.

We do believe that this dispute is governed by the UAW retiree settlement agreement by what happens in the

Page 11 evidentiary record at the sale hearing. And therefore, pursuant to paragraph 71 of the sale order and paragraph 26 of the UAW retiree settlement agreement, this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over this matter. THE COURT: Pause, please, Ms. Lennox. Aren't you asking me to do the exact same thing that Mr. Bromley and that I criticized him for? You're asking me to assume the fact to be decided? MS. LENNOX: Well, Your Honor, I'm not sure that we need to assume facts that aren't already quite clearly laid out in the agreements that Your Honor approved. The UAW retiree settlement agreement -- the issue, as Mr. Bromley framed it, is about what payments need to be made by New GM to the new VEBA and --THE COURT: I had understood subject --MS. LENNOX: -- was covered --THE COURT: No. Ms. Lennox, you can't interrupt me. MS. LENNOX: I'm sorry, Your Honor. THE COURT: I had understood that subject to your rights to be heard that the issue is to the extent of my exclusive jurisdiction putting aside whether I later decide if I do have exclusive jurisdiction to invoke it or to abstain, is the extent to which one or another of the orders or documents

whose construction I would have exclusive jurisdiction over is

either dispositive or material to this controversy.

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think that's an inappropriate way of articulating the relevant issue as to my exclusive jurisdiction?

MS. LENNOX: No. I think that's appropriate, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Now I will need, at some point in this call if you agree or after appropriate due process if you can't, to get my arms around the extent to which the controversy requires me to look at documents whose interpretation is within my exclusive jurisdiction. So if you weren't going to cover that further now, you can. But I'm also going to need from Mr. Bromley his views as to that because it appears to me that this thing may need to be sliced and diced in a couple of phases. First, to determine whether I have exclusive jurisdiction, as a 1(a), I'll call it; second, assuming that I do, whether I want to keep or invoke my exclusive jurisdiction or abstain in favor of the federal district court in the Eastern District of Michigan; and for either me or Judge Cohn, whoever the ultimate adjudicator turns out to be, a decision on the merits would need to be made. like you to address that. And what I need to do to enable each of you guys to do your jobs to tee these matters up for appropriate judicial determination -- one thing that troubles me, folks, and I attribute no blame to either of you but it's a problem that, from my perspective, I think needs to be addressed is after you guys laudably, in my view, took six

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months to try to settle the matter, now everything is going as if it's a preliminary injunction motion that has to be decided tomorrow on issues that have the potential of being a 450 million buck spread between the two of you and which requires thoughtful adjudication wherever it's adjudicated.

So give me your thoughts on that, Ms. Lennox. And then I'm going to ask more from Mr. Bromley. And I'm going to then give you a chance to be heard after he has another chance to be heard.

MS. LENNOX: Thank you, Your Honor. I think that Your Honor's suggesting of perhaps dividing the issues into jurisdiction and some merits certainly has some merit, Your Honor. Our view on exclusive jurisdiction is that the dispute between the parties are governed by Your Honor's sale order and by the UAW retiree settlement agreement. To the extent that the 2007 MOU that Mr. Bromley referenced is an assumed UAW CEA in the purchase agreement between Old GM and New GM, that would also fall within Your Honor's exclusive jurisdiction.

THE COURT: Pause, please. Did you say the 2007 agreement?

MS. LENNOX: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Help me understand that part of it because I thought the UAW's position is they have rights under the 2007 agreement which they contend survived. And your position is that the 2009 agreement is kind of like a defense

or a termination of the 2007 agreement.

MS. LENNOX: Well, but there are items in the 2007 agreement, Your Honor, that went beyond this issue. The 2007 agreement included things like what pension obligations -- at the time that agreement, Your Honor, was made between Old GM and Delphi and the UAW. There are many other matters in that agreement other than the matter that is -- the piece of that agreement that is before Your Honor today. For example, Old GM had agreed to bring some of the Delphi retirees into its pension plan and that arrangement carried through into this bankruptcy.

The UAW has alleged in this complaint that the 2007 MOU was therefore a collective bargaining agreement that was assumed and assigned to New GM.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me -- pause, please, Ms.

Lennox, because I want to make sure I'm keeping up with you.

You said that the 2007 agreement was assumed and assigned from Old GM to New GM but the parties differ on the extent to which it was modified by 2009 agreement?

MS. LENNOX: That's, I think, certainly the UAW's view as to how it was modified. Our view also is to whether conditions were satisfied is also an issue.

THE COURT: Right. Okay. Continue, please.

MS. LENNOX: So that being the case, that certainly is another matter with respect to the sale agreement that is

Page 15 within this Court's exclusive jurisdiction. And so, we 1 2 believe, Your Honor, that it's appropriate that Your Honor exercise exclusive jurisdiction over this matter. 3 THE COURT: Okay. Further thoughts before I give Mr. Bromley a chance to answer the same questions that I put to 5 6 you, Ms. Lennox? MS. LENNOX: No, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Okay. Before we go back to Mr. Bromley, 8 9 confirming and amplifying on something that I thought I saw in 10 the Jones Day letter although I'm not sure if you were the 11 signer of that or whether one of your colleagues was. 12 a second. 13 MS. LENNOX: I signed that letter, Your Honor. THE COURT: Oh, you did. Forgive me. I take it 14 you're cool -- although I guess I need to get the same answer 15 16 from Mr. Bromley -- to two adjustments in the briefing 17 schedules as to the issues that you have against each other. 18 One would be slowing things down in this Court to give Cleary a 19 little due process in the issues before me if there is an 20 agreement to disagree on my exclusive jurisdiction and slowing things down before Judge Cohn in the Eastern District of 21 Michigan to allow me to make this threshold determination. 22 23 MS. LENNOX: Yes, Your Honor, that's correct. We have no problem to an amendment to our briefing schedule before 24

Your Honor so long as the status quo is postponed in Michigan

as Your Honor articulated.

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THE COURT: Fair enough. Back to you, please.

MR. BROMLEY: Thank you, Your Honor. Let me address -- go back to the question that you posed to Ms. Lennox which is, is it appropriate or reasonable to think that this says something that could be sliced and diced, I think as you said. Thirdly, Your Honor, we do view that if this is going to go forward before Your Honor that there does need to be an adequate opportunity to deal with these issues. We do think they are material. The amounts at issue are substantial. And the parties here are engaged in a familial relationship.

Obviously, the UAW and New General Motors are -- work hand in glove every day on lots of issues. But the -- this is something that we do need to address.

The question of whether Your Honor has exclusive jurisdiction we do think is worth separate briefing. The documents that Ms. Lennox references both in her motion and in her letter are, I think, fair to describe as extraordinarily complicated in many ways. And the issues at hand relate to a number of documents. And the question, we think, actually relates to a single document as to which the Court does not have exclusive jurisdiction which is the Delphi 2007 MOU. But even if that is at issue, it is a document that is fifty pages long. There is a settlement agreement that is fifty pages

pages. The Delphi plan of reorganization itself is implicated. The retiree settlement agreement of 2009 itself is another thirty pages; sale order, another fifty pages. These are substantial documents that we don't believe are susceptible to immediate disposition if the Court is inclined to go forward on that basis.

But even leaving the documents aside, we do believe that there are threshold issues relating to jurisdiction. We have raised in our letter in the footnote the first-filed doctrine which we believe is implicated by the pre-existing action in Michigan.

THE COURT: You can brief that, Mr. Bromley, but do you seriously believe that first to file is a defense to an exclusive jurisdiction provision?

MR. BROMLEY: (Indiscernible)

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I couldn't hear that.

MR. BROMLEY: Well -- I'm sorry, Your Honor. That was not -- the -- I think that the question has to be fairly put in the following way. The action in Michigan relates to the 2007 MOU and whether or not New GM has an obligation to perform under it. Now the defense of that, an affirmative defense, is that it is somehow foreclosed by the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of the sale order. We believe it is not and so are argued that the action in Michigan on the underlying merits is on an agreement as to which this Court

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does not have exclusive jurisdiction. And I think the first issue is which Court should control and to avoid the possibility of inconsistent decisions and to avoid the possibility of the wasting of judicial resources.

So from our perspective, we do think it is appropriate to try to deal with it, first, as to which Court should be handling it and only then go to the merits.

And as to the timing issue that you have raised, Your Honor, we, too, are bothered by the idea that this dispute has been outstanding between the parties since October of 2009.

And with respect to the complaint since April, there is no emergency here that requires any compromise of a party's ability to fully brief this, to have discovery, if necessary, and to have a full and adequate hearing. There's a -- the fact is the demand for payment is a demand being made by the UAW.

That demand has been refused. So there's nothing pending.

There's no emergency. And so our view is that they should be dealt with in an appropriate time frame to recognize the magnitude of the issues and allow the parties to have their full day in court, so to speak.

THE COURT: All right. And I take it a corollary of that is that you agree with Ms. Lennox that if I determine that I need to determine whether I have exclusive jurisdiction, you're content with putting things on hold in the Eastern District of Michigan until we determine the phase I issues as I

articulated them before.

MR. BROMLEY: Well, Your Honor, I have to say that we are bothered by that. We do believe that there's -- well, there is a status conference next Wednesday. And there is a timeline for filing the responsive papers to the motion to strike.

THE COURT: Well, I think I could pick up the phone with Mr. Cohn -- Judge Cohen, excuse me -- and say listen, I've got a threshold issue. I don't want to put the UAW in contempt but I've got to find out whether what they did is violative of my order. Do you think he'd give me a hard time about kicking a status conference?

MR. BROMLEY: Well, Your Honor, I -- certainly, if you place it that way, I suspect that the status conference issue -- I suspect that judicial courtesy would dictate that he would certainly entertain that. So there is the deadline for filing the response briefing by Thursday.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Bromley, I've had issues of dueling jurisdiction before. I've also had lawyers try to give me this first-to-file argument. I think I had this exact issue in Adelphia when a bunch of people tried to enjoin the Time Warner sale by bringing an antitrust suit in Minnesota a week or two before an eighteen billion dollar deal was supposed to go through. And I called up my counterpart in Minnesota. I'm not sure if "counterpart" is the perfect word because he was a

district judge and I'm just a bankruptcy judge. But in about eight seconds, we agreed that I wouldn't step on his toes and we'd try to work cooperatively. Do you have a problem with that?

MR. BROMLEY: Your Honor, we certainly understand the need for judicial cooperation. And we're trying to balance the issues with respect to both sides. And I understand the suggestion that you're making. I would have to -- I don't have my client here in the room with me. I have to discuss it with them. But I can do so very quickly.

THE COURT: Well, you may want to let me know whether you consent because I don't want to be in a position to enjoin you in the next forty-eight hours, Mr. Bromley.

It appears to me that both of you guys are procedurally overreaching when there is a serious underlying issue here. This is much more difficult to determine than those dealership issues where the dealers were plainly subject to the earlier orders in the General Motors case. And they tried to get a second bite at the apple or a third, if you count their arbitrations, by going elsewhere. If you are wrong, Mr. Bromley, you're guilty of contempt. If you're right, then New GM is harassing you. The converse is equally true.

Now, I don't want to hold either side in contempt.

And I recognize as well or better than the two of you guys that

you are in a familial relationship as you articulated it, Mr. Bromley. And I don't think the parties want to be acting like jerks here. We got to tee this up for a judicial determination as to whether I have exclusive jurisdiction. And if I do, whether it's most sensible for me to exercise it or to put a matter that I may not bring anything special to the table on in the hands of the district judge even if I have exclusive jurisdiction, those not being identical issues.

Now, my tentative, subject to both sides' rights to be heard, is to slow this down on both fronts to tee up the jurisdictional issue so I know whether or not I have exclusive jurisdiction. And if either side wants me to abstain, assuming I do, whether I should abstain or not. I don't want either side putting a gun to the head of the other that's going to deny its substantive rights. Or, when you're talking about procedural rights of this characters, they have substantive effect. So, as I said, my tentative is to slow this down, to direct you guys to come up with a briefing schedule on whether or not I have exclusive jurisdiction and whether I should exercise it.

Then either Judge Cohn or I will decide the merits depending on the outcome to the first two questions. If it is contended by either side that discovery is necessary to tee up these issues on the merits or on the threshold procedural issues, my tentative, subject to your respective rights to be

heard, is to give each of you whatever discovery either side wants assuming it's otherwise reasonable because whether I decide it or Judge Cohn decides it, it's going to be necessary at some point in time. And I don't know at this juncture, but I'll certainly invite you to give me your views, as to whether any discovery is necessary on the threshold issues or not. But if and to the extent they are, on a 450 million buck matter, I'm of the view to give you that as well.

Now, Mr. Bromley, I'm not looking for you to play

Let's Make a Deal, but I want you to respond on the merits to

my approach from a case management perspective.

MR. BROMLEY: Thank you, Your Honor. From a case management perspective, I do believe that this is a matter of magnitude that requires appropriate briefing. I do believe that if we are able to put both matters in a half suspended automation that we should be able to reach an agreement on a briefing schedule as well as whether or not any discovery is required. We certainly have historically had a very cooperative relationship with counsel to both Old GM and New GM and we believe that we can behave in the manners as to which you expect, Your Honor, in making sure that we accommodate the interests of the parties and the Court and give proper deference to the magnitude of the issue.

So, from a procedural perspective, I do agree -- or a case management perspective, if you will, that the proposal you

made does make sense. Like I said, I do need to contact my client directly which we are in the process of doing in the other room. But I would like to defer for the moment that they may hear Ms. Lennox's reaction to your proposal.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Lennox?

MS. LENNOX: Thank you, Mr. Bromley. Your Honor, I think we've articulated before that we think Your Honor's approach is sensible and makes sense. This certainly is an issue of some magnitude and Mr. Bromley is correct. We've always had very cordial working relationships and I would expect that to continue.

I think our initial view on certainly the first matter about whether there's exclusive jurisdiction and that matter would not require discovery though we'd certainly be happy to talk that over with Mr. Bromley and come up with a briefing schedule in answer to that question as well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Now I'm sure you'll understand.

I'm loathe to tell Judge Cohn what to do. The way that I do

things like this is if somebody puts -- requires me to, I

enjoin the parties and not the judge. But what I would much

prefer to do as my questions to mainly Mr. Bromley implied is

to get your consent for the avoidance of doubt so I can pick up

the phone to Judge Cohn and work with him so that I'm

respecting his jurisdiction and he's respecting mine. I think

that's especially so because I think the issue, as you may know from the Rally transcript, is not whether the Michigan district court has subject matter jurisdiction of this controversy. I think it plainly does. It's a classic 1331 issue. But the issue for -- that is ultimately dispositive is not whether it has subject matter jurisdiction because, as I noted in the Rally thing, state courts have subject matter jurisdiction in over practically everything that comes through their doors, but whether the forum that doesn't have exclusive jurisdiction has to stay its hand in exercising its subject matter jurisdiction in deference to the earlier exclusive jurisdiction provision which, I think, even the Supreme Court has stated is something that is worthy of respect. So, am I correct, Ms. Lennox, that you don't object to me conferring with Judge Cohn also? MS. LENNOX: No, Your Honor. We do not object to that. THE COURT: All right. So then if I -- if and when we get the consent from the UAW, that is no longer an issue. MS. LENNOX: Correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Now I do have the power, of course, to manage my own docket. So on the matter that is before me, you're to agree upon a mutually satisfactory briefing schedule for determining both of what I called the 1(a) and 1(b) issues. In your briefs, I want you particularly

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to focus on the extent to which the controversy before you, which is now pending in the Eastern District of Michigan or which has been fleshed out most in the Eastern District of Michigan, requires me to make -- requires a judge -- me, if New GM is right; Judge Cohn, if the UAW is right -- to construe or enforce one or more documents that were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of the 363 sale order that was entered into in July 2009 or any other order that I entered. Now it's my general understanding, subject to your rights to be heard, that there may be an issue of both contractual interpretation and order interpretation. because when I read the papers in preparation for this call, I only each side's view of the world on one issue and you hadn't completed briefing, I don't know if my understanding is right or not. You are to tee up the issues as you see fit.

Mr. Bromley, I need you to tell me by --

MR. BROMLEY: Your Honor, can I interrupt you for one second? I apologize.

THE COURT: Yes. Go ahead.

MR. BROMLEY: I have an answer to this question that you're about to ask. We just asked -- we do consent to you contacting Judge Cohn and we will cooperate on delaying that schedule.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, what I'm going to encourage Judge Cohn to do, assuming he's amenable, is to let me do my

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job and decide whether this is something where I have exclusive jurisdiction and to ask him to cut me some slack on the scheduling. And I'll put it appropriately, of course, but the idea is that neither he nor I be fighting with each other in terms of a jurisdictional battle. I got to tell you, in ten years as a bankruptcy judge, I've never had a battle with another federal judge and I'm sure this is going to be no different. But obviously, I got to discuss it with him.

So, as you get off the phone, I want you to work up a schedule for teeing this up for judicial determination in a way that satisfactorily meets both of your needs. Focus on the discovery front on (a) whether either sides wants or needs discovery on what I'll call the 1(a) and 1(b) issues; and, secondly, whether since the merits, if you can't settle, are going to have to be determined somewhere anyhow, whether you might as well get to work on any discovery associated with that portion., it appearing to me that the discovery will be substantially the same whether it's decided in the Southern District of New York or in the Eastern District of Michigan.

Anything else, anybody?

MS. LENNOX: Not from us, Your Honor.

MR. BROMLEY: Your Honor, just one question to -this is Jim Bromley. So for the time being, the existing
objection deadline of the 2nd and the hearing date of the 9th
are extended out without a date pending the briefs of the

Page 27 parties and the approval of the Court of a new briefing 1 2. schedule. Is that --3 THE COURT: Are you talking about deadlines before me? 4 MR. BROMLEY: Yes, Your Honor. 5 6 THE COURT: Yes. Anything that I have the power to control, I'm putting in abeyance subject to being papered in a 7 new superseding scheduling order. MR. BROMLEY: Thank you, Your Honor. That's what I 9 10 I just wanted to confirm. assumed. 11 THE COURT: But I am not, in this call especially, changing Judge Cohn's schedules. I think I need to talk to him 12 about that. 13 (Pause) 14 THE COURT: And I propose to do that as soon as I get 15 16 off the phone here. 17 MS. LENNOX: Thank you, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Okay. MR. BROMLEY: Thank you, Your Honor. We appreciate 19 20 the conference. THE COURT: Very well. Have a good day. 21 22 MS. LENNOX: Thank you very much. THE COURT: Right. We're adjourned. 23 (Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 3:46 p.m.) 24 25

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                             CERTIFICATION
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       I, Lisa Bar-Leib, certify that the foregoing transcript is a
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       true and accurate record of the proceedings.
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